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L STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This is a case where all the facts at trial showed that Leo Gilbride ("Gilbride") used 
deception, dishonesty, and lies to obtain title to David Kosmann's ("Kosmann") home. Then at 
trial, Gilbride perjured himself in an attempt to cover up and rationalize all his prior dishonesty 
to Kosmann. In the end, Gilbride was able to keep title to the home, despite his dishonesty, based 
on a technicality in the law: Kosmann and Gilbride had an oral contract for Kosmann to buy 
back the house but that contract was too indefinite to be enforceable by the court. Now, Gilbride 
is on appeal hoping to double down on his ill-gotten windfall. He is asking this Court to sanction 
his dishonesty to Kosmann and his perjury to the jury and district court by also awarding him 
attorney fees from the litigation, fees that were properly denied by the district court. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Appellant's Brief is remarkable in that it says almost nothing about the trial of this case 
and the evidence that was presented at trial. Gilbride wants to bury his deception, dishonesty, and 
perjury and act like it never happened. It did happen and the story must be told because it bears 
directly on many important aspects of this appeal. 
1 
Kosmann filed this lawsuit on January 25, 2013, less than a month after he signed a 
Warranty Deed on December 27, 2012 transferring his home to Gilbride. (Record ("R.") 12-17, 
40-46) Kosmann's complaint explained that he transferred the home to Gilbride based upon an 
oral agreement that Kosmann would cover all the costs of the home (paying $30,990 to cover all 
closing and downpayment costs and paying rent to cover all mortgage payments), would remain 
living in the home, and would eventually buy the home back when he had the financing. (Id.) 
1 Counsel apologizes for the length of this brief. However, in addition to being relevant to the issues on the appeal, 
the facts of this case shock the conscience and require a full retelling. 
1 
Kosmann asserted that Gilbride immediately reneged on the oral agreement and posted an 
notice on less than two the closing, 
enforce the buyback agreement to recover the Property. (Id) In his Answer and Counterclaim, 
Gilbride denied having received $30,990 from Kosmann for closing on the home, denied having 
any agreement to let Kosmann remain in the home, and asserted that the purchase and sale 
agreement allowed Gilbride to take possession immediately upon closing. (R 18-24, 47-53) 
These were the first three of Gilbride's misrepresentations to the district court (as determined by 
the factual findings of the district court after trial). (R. 67-75, 80-81) 
The parties' claims and counterclaims were litigated for several years, culminating in a 
Jury trial that commenced on January 27, 2015. (R. 2-11) During the jury trial, Gilbride' s 
deception to Kosmann and to the district court was brought to light. The following facts are 
taken directly from the trial testimony (particularly Gilbride's own admissions) and trial exhibits. 
1. Kosmann 's Series of Unfortunate Events and "Underwater" Nfortgage. 
Kosmann is a college graduate and was an Air Force pilot from 1988 through 1999, when 
he was honorably discharged and hired by United Airlines to fly the 737. (Trial Transcript "Tr.") 
(Tr. 6:16-8:6, 8:7-15) In 2000, his family (he and his now ex-wife have eleven children) 
purchased their residence at 1020 W. Homedale Rd. Caldwell, Idaho (the "Property") for 
approximately $170,000. (Tr. 8:16-9:2, 88:15-21) 
The events of September 11, 2001, however, resulted in a downturn in the airline industry 
and began a series of unfortunate events in Kosmann's life. In February of 2003, United 
furloughed Kosmann; during the next three years of unemployment, Kosmann paid his expenses 
by expanding his hobby of restoring car trim. (Tr. 12:10-25, 13:1-12, 74:23-75:9) He ran the car 
trim restoration business from the garages on the Property, keeping numerous "parts cars" on the 
Property. (Id.) In May of 2006, Kosmann was rehired as a pilot for United. (Tr. 13:13-16) In 
2 
~-~~,,,.~,.., obtained a significant home equity loan against the Property ma 
on Property) the a estate 
investment. (Tr. 88:24-89:15) In May of 2009, Kosmann was furloughed again by United and 
returned to his trim business, while also receiving some unemployment benefits. (Tr. 13: 13-14: 8) 
In 2010, Kosmann and his wife of twenty-four years divorced, with Kosmann keeping the 
Property and its corresponding underwater mortgage. (Tr. 8 :20-21, 14:9-16) Some of his children 
also remained living with Kosmann in the Property. (Tr. 9:1-2) 
By 2011, Kosmann was still in financial difficulties and he was paying on a mortgage 
that was approximately $130,000 more than the value of his Property. (Tr. 14:17-15:13) 
Kosmann had unsuccessfully tried to obtain a modification or refinance of the mortgage. (Tr. 
14:17-16:5) 
2. Finding a Realtor and "Friend" to Facilitate A Short Sale and Lease With 
"Buy Back". 
Kosmann began speaking with a realtor, Justin McCarthy ("McCarthy"), about finding a 
solution to his underwater mortgage through a short sale and lease with an option to purchase. 
(Tr. 16:6-17:16, 166:17-167:4) Kosmann and McCarthy planned to have a third party (whether 
investors brought in by McCarthy or a friend of Kosmann) buy the Property from Kosrnann 
through a short sale process, with Kosmann's lender eliminating the deficiency balance, and with 
Kosmann remaining in the Property as a renter and covering all costs of the Property, and 
eventually repurchasing the Property at the fair market value and with a much reduced mortgage. 
(Tr. 16:6-17:16, 167:9-168:2, 169:24-170:22) McCarthy knew the main goal for Kosmann was 
to resolve the underwater mortgage while still keeping the Property. (Tr.166: 17, 168: 14-170:22) 
Kosmann and McCarthy first worked with Kosmann's girlfriend, Kathleen Brady, to be the 
buyer, but those efforts fizzled because the relationship ended. (Tr. 18:2-20: 18, 26:4-27: 10, 
3 
l brought long-time friend Brad Stirling to 
12-28:21, 169:6-1 
It was at this time, in May of 2012, while unemployed as a pilot and desperate to fix his 
underwater mortgage, that Kosmann met Gilbride. (Tr. 29: 15, 309:20-21) They connected 
because Gilbride also had a military background and an interest in motorcycles and classic cars. 
(Tr. Kosmann 29:21-30:6, 239:11-23, 315:2-5) At the end of the summer, Gilbride and Kosmann 
began discussing Kosmann's need for a friend to help him resolve his underwater mortgage and 
Gilbride indicated he would do it. (Tr. 28:22-29:20, 30:7-31 :4, 239:24-241:3) Gilbride knew it 
was Kosmam1's intent to keep the Property. (Tr. 239:24-240: 13, 320:23-321 :8) Kosmann 
brought Gilbride to McCarthy. Gilbride did not have his own realtor, and there is no evidence 
that Gilbride was otherwise in the market to "invest" in real property. (Tr. 28:22-29:20, 170:23-
171 :4, 174:4-20, 240:14-20) 
3. The Sale of the Home to Gilbride, Using Kosmann 's Af oney. 
Per the short sale process, McCarthy had the parties sign a RE-21 Real Estate Purchase 
and Sale Agreement ("PSA") in late September 2012 (Gilbride signed September 18th and the 
Kosmanns signed September 24th) that was then sent to the lender. The PSA stated that it was 
contingent on Kosmann getting his deficiency released by his lender GMAC and "[Kosmann] 
will rent the property back from [Gilbride] for a term of not less than 1 year." The PSA was 
incorrectly dated 7 /14/11 and had a box checked saying "buyer shall be entitled to possession 
upon closing," despite the specific provision for Kosmann to rent the property for at least a year. 
4 
at that had to rent the at a year. 
13, I· 1 
After Gilbride signed the PSA, Kosmann began funneling money to Gilbride. On 
September 22, 2012, Kosmann came to Gilbride's home and gave him $22,900 in cash (it was 
supposed to be $23,000 but was accidentally short). (Tr. 35:1-37:23, 39:4-42:19, 247:24-249:3, 
255:1-3) Kosmann paid additional amounts of $3,000 on October 1st and $4,000 in mid-
November, for a total of $29,900. (Id.) Texts between the parties document both the payments 
and their context related to the purchase of the Property. (Tr. 55:23-59:25, Aug. 27-28, 31-32) 
McCarthy admitted at trial that he had been a\Vare of discussions between the parties about 
Kosmann giving Gilbride money for the closing. (Tr. 179:9-180:4, 184:2-18, 209:14-210:18, 
218:7-14, Aug. 25-26) Gilbride's ex-girlfriend, Michelle Phillips, testified that on October 4, 
2012 she had a dinner with Gilbride during which Gilbride explained he was buying the Property 
to help out his friend Kosmann and "he was going to let Dave still live in the house with a rent-
lease option to purchase the house. . . . He was going to rent it back to [Kosmann J . . . for a 
couple hundred dollars more than what his payment would be. That way everybody would be 
happy." (Tr. 152:16-155:14, 157:13-158:2) Phillips further testified that Gilbride described the 
$23,000 cash payment as "for a house transaction that they were entering into. And there was 
going to be a couple more thousand coming in the near future." (Id.) Gilbride also included 
Kosmann's money on Gilbride's loan application in qualifying for his $88,000 loan to buy the 
Property. (Tr. 41:9-42:20, 249:4-251: 1, 288:21-289: 18, Aug. 25-27, 43-50) 
The lender eventually required the price to be increased from $111,000 to $117,500 and 
agreed to waive the remaining approximately $160,000 in deficiency. (Tr. 98:14, 100:8-24, Aug. 
2 Per this Court's "Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Motion to Augment ... , issued February 22, 
2016, the "Order Granting Renewed Motion to Augment the Record," issued February 25, 2016, and the "Order 
Granting Second Motion to Augment," issued March 14, 2016. 
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order to get the short sale approved, Gilbride and Kosmann each signed an Addendum 
"Seller and sale is an ' Length' and 
the Seller and Buyer are unrelated to each other by family, marriage or commercial enterprise" 
plus a "Short Payoff Arms-Length Affidavit" from GMAC Mortgage. (Tr. 33:5-34:25, Aug. 21-
22, 52) McCarthy testified at trial that money being funneled from Kosman to Gilbride and the 
oral buyback agreement both violated this "Arm's Length" representation. (Tr. 182:17-183:5, 
191: I 15) Gilbride admitted as much also, but he testified that he had not received any money 
for the property and had not agreed to any buyback (the district court would find all his 
testimony on these two points non-credible, i.e. a lie). (Tr. 338:7-19, 284:8-13, 329:17-330:8) 
The actual closing and down payment costs totaled $31,629.82, with $29,375 (25%) 
going towards a down payment on the Property. (Tr. 324:6-23, Aug. 19) On December 26th, 
Gilbride sent a text to Kosmann stating that he was going in to sign for the closing and asking 
about an additional $1,000. (Tr. 40:2-25, 64:5-23, 223:21-224:9, 255:9-11, 262:10-263:10; Aug. 
31-32) Kosmann gave Gilbride that additional $1,000 on December 26th and 27th, bringing the 
total money he gave Gilbride to $30,990, almost the full closing costs and consistent with the 
agreement that Kosmann would cover the costs of the purchase of the Property. (Id.) On 
December 27, 2012, a Warranty Deed was recorded from the Kosmanns to Gilbride. (Tr. 325:15-
17, Aug. 51) 
4. Gilbride 's Numerous Deceitful Actions to Violate His Agreements With Kosmann and 
Take Kosmann 's Property and Assets 
Prior to the closing, Gilbride was already secretly putting in motion his plans on how to 
renege on his oral agreement with Kosmann and obtain Kosmann's assets. Gilbride understood 
that Kosmann was temporally unemployed as a pilot and his main income at the time was 
coming from the trim restoration business on the Property. (Tr. 241 :23-243 :4) Before the 
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spoke a code at 
set a January 1 inspection of the because 
the car trim business and the many "parts cars" on the Property. 226:20-232: 16) Gilbride 
wanted the business shut down and the vehicles removed as code violations. (Tr. 234:3-16, 
245:1-246:11) Gilbride did not disclose these conversations to Kosmann (Tr. 52:8-53:21, 
244: 10-20); instead, Gilbride merely told Kosmann that insurance had insured the Property but 
had required a higher premium because of the number of vehicles. (Tr. 60:4-62:6, 280: 1 7-20, 
Aug. 29) Gilbride also did not disclose to Kosmann that Gilbride unilaterally told the insurer that 
all of Kosmann's "parts cars" would be removed. (Tr. 243:8-244:9) 
The night of December 27th, just hours after the recording of the Warranty Deed to 
Gilbride, Gilbride went to the Property to present Kosmann with the never-before-seen written 
rental agreement. (Tr. 60:4-62:6, 264:22-266:11, Aug. 1-14) Gilbride had Kosmann sign a 
"Receipt for Rental Agreement" that said, "Original signed and non altered 'Rental Agreement' 
must be returned to Leo Gilbride within 24 hours of signing this receipt, or all rights to occupy 
the premises are forfeited and premises must be vacated within 30 days." (Tr. 265:6-10, Aug. 20) 
Kosmann reviewed the proposed Rental Agreement and was horrified. (Tr. 48: 14-17) The 
document had numerous egregious and unfair terms: $5,000 due within 24 hours (consisting of a 
security deposit of $1,000, first and last month rent deposit totaling $3,200, and a half-rent 
payment of $800); monthly rent of $1733 a month ( despite a mortgage payment of only $806 and 
an appraisal stating market value rent was $1,000); pet deposits of $500 or $1,000 per small or 
large animal; Gilbride would store his dump truck and tractor on the Property; Gilbride had a lien 
on all of Kosmann's personal property and the right to sell all of the personal property (in the 
event of default) and keep "money over and above what [he was] owed;" fourteen days for 
7 
to of or remove 
and not on no commercial use the 
without prior written consent from Gilbride and conformity to zoning laws; a one-way attorney 
fee provision protecting Gilbride; no option to purchase and instead a one-year tem1 with no 
option to renew; and Kosmann had 24 hours to sign the non-negotiable lease and make all 
payments or else the property is forfeited, including the 25% down payment by Kosmann. (Tr. 
48:5-8, Aug. 1-14, 33, 35) Gilbride admitted that this Rental Agreement was his unilateral 
creation and had not been disclosed prior to closing. (Tr. 263:21-264:14, 327:15-328:5, Aug. 30, 
39) 
The next day, Kosmann met with Gilbride at Shari's Restaurant ("Shari's Meeting"), and 
Kosmann secretly recorded the conversation. At the meeting: 
• Gilbride openly discussed Kosmann' s expectation to buy the home back and the fact that 
McCarthy had indicated they should wait until 90 days after closing and then sign the 
agreement for the lease with option to purchase (per the requirements of the lender), but 
Gilbride indicated he was not going to let that happen, was making no promise he would 
ever allow a buy back, and was not going to even discuss the buy back until Kosmann 
signed the rental agreement and a year passed; 
• Gilbride repeatedly made comments to indicate Kosmann would potentially be able to 
buy back the Property in the future but Gilbride refused to put anything in writing that 
would be enforceable; 
• Gilbride refused to negotiate any terms of the Rental Agreement; 
• On at least seven different occasions, Kosmann said he gave the $31,000 for the Property, 
the down payment, or as his investment in the Property, and each time Gilbride either 
said nothing to disagree or explicitly agreed; 
• Gilbride claimed he was entitled to $1,733 in rent in order to make repairs at the property, 
however, Gilbride also: said that if Kosmann did the repairs himself then Gilbride would 
still require the $1,733 in rent; refused to show Kosmann any paperwork to support any 
current or future repairs; refused to let Kosmann get a second opinion on any repair costs; 
refused to limit the period that Kosmann would have to pay this bloated rental payment; 
and admitted contextually that none of this had been discussed at any prior time. 
• Gilbride twice told Kosmann that he could keep all the vehicles on the Property as long 
as he had a bill of sale or title, and Gilbride did not disclose that he had already contacted 
8 
code enforcement about the vehicles being a code 
insurance that the vehicles would be removed; 
• Gilbride refused to Kosmann the closing documents or 
closing costs were much higher than Kosmann expected; 
and already 
• Kosmann pointed out that it was unfair of Gilbride to make unilateral decisions with 
Kosmann's money to pay higher closing costs, and Gilbride failed to disclose that he had 
unilaterally increased the down payment from 20% to 25%; 
• Kosmann pointed out that he paid $31,000 towards the Property and some of that money 
should be used to waive the initial rent payments being demanded but Gilbride refused; 
• Gilbride unilaterally said that the most recent $1,000 paid by Kosmann would be applied 
to a security deposit on the Rental Agreement that had never been previously discussed; 
• Gilbride threatened Kosmann that if he defaulted on the Rental Agreement then he would 
lose the down payment and investment he had in the Property; and 
• Gilbride claimed it was an accident that he ended up with a 15 year mortgage (instead of 
30 year), increasing the mortgage payment that Kosmann would have to cover, but 
Gilbride admitted he could have fixed the mistake with a delay of closing and Gilbride 
did not disclose the issue to Kosmann. 
(Tr. 277:10-25, Aug. 23 (audio)) Not surprisingly, Kosmann refused to sign the Rental 
Agreement despite Gilbride's repeated threats. (Aug. 34-37 & 40-42) It is not hard to imagine 
the further harm Gilbride would have pursued against Kosmann had Kosmann naively signed the 
Rental Agreement. 
On December 31, 2012, Gilbride left a voice message for Arthur at CCCE that said 
Gilbride now owned the Property, that Kosmann would not sign the Rental Agreement, and 
Gilbride was authorizing Arthur to do his site inspection of the Property as soon as he wanted. 
(Tr. 230: 15-231: 12, Aug. 24 (audio)) Gilbride mentioned the vehicles on the Property and he 
also asserted that there was some Sodium Hydroxide tank issue on the Property. (Aug. 24 
(audio)) As requested, Arthur visited the Property and on January 7, 2013, Arthur sent a Notice 
of Violation to both Gilbride and Kosmann regarding too many vehicles on the Property. (Tr. 
73:25-74:20, 232.14-16, Aug. 16-17) This was the first notice that Kosmann received about any 
potential code violation on the Property, and Kosmann still was unaware that Gilbride was 
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12, : 1-246: ) Arthur would further testify Gilbride 
a be to 
a citation and/or probable cause affidavit to the judge at the time would illustrate that he is being 
damaged by Mr. Kosmann's actions"). (Tr. 232: 17-234:20) Gilbride admitted at trial that he 
threatened a lawsuit against code enforcement if they did not issue a citation against Kosmann 
and the Property. (Tr. 270:23-271 :2) 
On January 11, 2013, Gilbride posted a "Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate'' on the 
Property. (Tr. 70:13-71:15, 282:15-283:17, Aug. 15) It stated that Kosmann was in default for 
rent in the amount of $3,200 (Gilbride's unilateral security deposit demand) and had three days 
to pay or move out. (Id.) Kosmann realized he had been tricked and hired Kevin Dinius 
("Dinius") to file a lawsuit to try and enforce the buyback agreement and recover his $30,990. 
On January 25, 2013, Dinius filed the lawsuit alleging breach of contract, specific performance, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and (in an 
Amended Complaint) fraud. (R 12-17, 40-46) Gilbride counterclaimed for breach of contract, 
ejectment, and unlawful detainer/eviction. (R 18-24, 47-53) Kosmann (through Dinius) 
immediately sent $1,000 rent payments to Gilbride for January and February, which Gilbride 
rejected and demanded $1773 a month. (Tr. 335:17-336:6) After numerous motions, the court 
ordered that Kosmann would pay $1,000 monthly for the Property and those payments continued 
throughout the litigation. (Tr. 75: 10-81:20) 
5. Gilbride 's Repeated Perjury to Try and Cover His Deceit to Kosmann. 
It appears that Kosmann first learned of Gilbride's "car part story" on March 1, 2013, 
when Gilbride provided his first discovery responses. In response to Request for Admission No. 
4 asking Gilbride to admit "the parties agreed [Kosmann] would pay [Gilbride] more than 
$31,000 so that Defendant would have sufficient funds to close on the Property," Gilbride 
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answered, "Denied. Defendant sold Plaintiff a 1957 Chevrolet convertible rebuilt chassis and two 
rear for parts. Defendant received $27,500 from Plaintiff for such parts." 
At his deposition on March 26, 2013, still unaware of the secret recording, Gilbride 
falsely claimed that during the December 28, 2012, Shari's Meeting he was clear in telling 
Kosman.n that the $30,990 was for car parts (the audio confirmed that car parts were never 
mentioned during the Shari's Meeting as the "car parts story" had not yet been invented by 
Gilbride). (Tr. 259:25-260:8, 277:10-25, Aug. 23 (audio)) Gilbride also testified at his deposition 
that he told realtor McCarthy that the $30,990 was for car parts; however, McCarthy testified at 
trial that he had never heard anything about car parts. (Tr. 180:5-7, 253 :23-254:6) 
On March 14, 2014, Gilbride served Kosmann with a "Termination of Tenancy Thirty 
Day Notice" that stated, "your month-to-month tenancy of the premises is terminated for the 
following reason: I will use property as my primary residence. Failure to comply with multiple 
letters of violation from Canyon Co Code Enforcement. This is your thirty (30) day written 
notice to vacate the property." (Tr. 81:21-83:21, Aug. 18) Gilbride then filed a new and separate 
pro se unlawful detainer action against Kosmann ( despite Gilbride having counsel litigating this 
case), which was summarily dismissed. (Id.) 
On January 27, 2015, the jury trial went forward regarding Kosmann's claims and 
Gilbride's counterclaims. The numerous facts stated and cited above showing Gilbride lies and 
deception came out in evidence. At trial, Gilbride admitted that McCarthy and Kosmann both 
told him that Kosmann's main goal was to permanently retain the Property, that Kosmann, both 
before and immediately after closing, told Gilbride that he intended and wanted to buy the 
Property back from Gilbride, yet Gilbride claimed that he had always only told Kosmann that 
they could discuss a buyback but he was not guaranteeing anything. (Tr. 239:24-241 :3, 320:23-
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1. 31 19:9) That "story, of course, was dependant on Gilbride having an explanation 
Kosmann Gilbride $30,990 was not an agreement 
Kosmann to get the home back. 
So, Gilbride had to persist with his "story" that the $30,990 he received from Kosmann 
was for car parts. He invented an explanation for: why no car parts had ever been delivered 
despite the payment of $30,990 (Tr. 251:2-252:15, 255:4-8, 296:23-297:7, 296:23-297:7, 297:8-
22, 348:10-352:6); why Kosmann bought parts he had never seen (Tr. 285:18-286:13, 298:3-
301:12); \vhy Gilbride never mentioned car parts during the audio of the Shari's Meeting (Tr. 
295:21-296:22, 353:10-354:22); why he asked for another $1,000 from Kosmann at the time of 
closing (Tr. 262:10-263:10); why Gilbride could be heard on audio at the Shari's Meeting 
agreeing that Kosmann had paid money towards the Property (Tr. 284:14-285:17, 288:21-
289:18, 353:10-354:22); why it appeared that he was using Kosmann's money for the down 
payment and closing costs (Tr. 288:21-295:12), and why he had threatened Kosmann that he 
would lose his "down payment" if he did not sign the Rental Agreement. (Tr. 363: 1-15) 
Gilbride invented an elaborate narrative of the negotiations with Kosmann over the car 
parts (Tr. 298:3-301:12), he claimed $30,000 was the fair market value for the car parts, without 
producing any evidence of value (Tr. 254: 13-25, 298:3-301: 12), he changed his deposition 
testimony about whom he had told about the car parts deal (Tr. 253:20-254:12, 419:23-420:19), 
he brought in his wife and best friend to claim that he told them about the car parts ( clearly 
inadmissible hearsay) (Tr. 403:7-416:16, 426:7-432:1), and he tried to discredit the clear 
testimony of his ex-girlfriend about his own admissions about the $30,990. (Tr. 418:20-419:15) 
Gilbride had no explanation for why he never mentioned the car parts in any texts, bill of sale, or 
other \Vritings to Kosmann (Tr. 256:16-23, 262:7-9), why he incorrectly stated in his deposition 
12 
had discussed the car parts with Kosmann during the Shari's Restaurant meeting (Tr. 
he had no than car 
parts story. In other words, Gilbride repeatedly provided perjured testimony regarding how he 
had not agreed to a buyback and how he had not accepted the $30,990 as part of that agreement. 
Gilbride did not stop with those misrepresentations. He claimed that he did not call code 
enforcement, seek to shut down Kosmann's home business, or provide the unconscionable rental 
agreement with the intent to harm Kosmann, take immediate possession of the Property, 
invalidate his agreement to rent the property to Kosmann for at least a year, steal Kosmann's 
$30,990, or invalidate his buy back agreement. (Tr. 330:16-332:25, 335:5-12, 271:21-272:16) 
Gilbride invented non-credible "explanations" for: why he demanded $1,733 in monthly rent (Tr. 
267:8-268:3, 328:12-329:16, 336:20-337:6), why he demanded $5,000 in immediate rental 
deposits and payment (Tr. 329: 17-330: 15), why he was secretly meeting with code enforcement 
and asking for violations and citations to be issued (Tr. 283:18-284:13), why he told the insurer 
he would get Kosmann's vehicles removed without discussing it with Kosmann (Tr. 279:9-
280:8), why he did not tell Kosmann about his belief that the vehicles needed to be moved and 
the business stopped on the Property (Tr. 330: 16-332:25), why he lied to Kosmann during the 
Shari's Meeting about keeping all the vehicles on the Property (Tr. 270: 1-15), why he did not tell 
Kosmann that he was behind the violation letter from code enforcement (Tr. 330: 16-332:25), 
why he included all the provisions in the rental agreement about the property, business, and 
vehicles being in compliance with code (Tr. 329: 17-332:25), why he made the rental agreement 
non-negotiable (Tr. 329: 17-330: 15), why he sought to evict Kosmann just two weeks into his one 
year rental (Tr. 334:9-335:4), why he had a provision in the rental agreement allowing him to sell 
all of Kosmann's personal assets and keep all proceeds (regardless of any amount owed) 
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1:21 ·16, 329:1 15), and where he got the unconscionable terms m rental 
were reasonable. 15) 
Gilbride had no explanation for why he waited until after closing on the Propertv to: 
spring the rental agreement and its non-negotiable, undisclosed, and unconscionable terms upon 
Kosmann; disclose the 15 year mortgage and resulting higher mortgage payment: disclose his 
desire for Kosmann to shut down his business on the Property; disclose the payment of a 25% 
downpayment with Kosmann's money rather than 20%: disclose his promise to the property 
insurer that the vehicles would be removed: or disclose his concerns with possible code 
violations and his raising those issues with code enforcement. 
In sum, almost all of Gilbride's trial testimony to the court and jury was not truthful and 
his truthful admissions revealed his shocking deceit. Gilbride even tried to use his military 
service and deployments to Iraq to bolster the credibility of his many misrepresentations to the 
jury. (Tr. 301: 13-304:2) It is disturbing to consider what additional harm \vould have been done 
by Gilbride if Kosmann had not secretly recorded that Shari's Meeting or if Kosmann had 
foolishly signed the Rental Agreement under pressure of losing his home to Gilbride. 
6. The Court Finds the Oral Contract Is too Indefinite to Enforce and Finds That 
Gilbride Is Not Credible and Cannot Keep Kosmann 's Down Payment. 
However, after only two days of trial, Kosmann rested his case and the district court 
entered a directed verdict against him regarding his claim to enforce a buyback of the Property. 
(Tr. 392:3-395:22) The court concluded that the parties did not have a specific agreement that 
could be enforced. (Id.) Kosmann had truthfully admitted that the parties had never specified the 
terms for when or how Kosmann would buy back the home; Kosmann had just relied on 
friendship and expected to work out those details in the future. (Tr. 129:22-131:8, 132:23-133:3) 
Kosmann had also admitted that he did not yet have financing finalized to buy back his home. 
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l 1 141: l The parties dismissed proceeded court 
numerous court ended, parties 
submitted post-trial briefing and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Aug. 56-82) 
On March 30th, the district court issued its "Memorandum Decision Following Court 
Trial." (R. 65-87) The court ruled that Gilbride had been unjustly enriched in the amount of the 
$30,990 and that money should be returned to Kosmann. (R. 67-69) The court specifically found 
that Gilbride' s story about the car parts vvas not credible: 
The Court does not find Defendant's testimony and arguments regarding the 
car parts contract to be credible .... the evidence does not support the 
existence of an agreement for the sale of car parts, much less that the 
$30,990.00 Plaintiff paid to Defendant between September and December 
of 2012 was in furtherance of such an agreement. In fact, the timing of the 
payments make more sense in the context of the parties' agreement that 
Plaintiff would fund the down payment and closing costs as a condition of 
Defendant agreeing to purchase the real property. The evidence establishes 
that Plaintiff paid Defendant $22,990.00 on September 23, 2012, the day 
before Plaintiff executed the purchase and sale agreement. Plaintiff 
subsequently paid Defendant $3,000 on October 1 and $4,000.00 on 
November 19, 2012. At their December 28, 2012 meeting at Shari's 
Restaurant, when Plaintiff stated to Defendant that he put money toward 
Defendant's loan, Defendant responded, "That's right, you did." There is no 
reason Defendant would have made such an admission if the payments from 
Plaintiff to Defendant had been made on an executory contract for the 
purchase of automobiles and automobile parts. The court does not believe 
Defendant's explanation at trial that he was simply allowing Plaintiff to 
talk, since Defendant was very direct and adamant in addressing every 
matter Plaintiff raised at the meeting .... 
(R. 70-71) As discussed above, the court could have cited manv more facts showing Gilbride's 
car parts story was not credible. The court also found Gilbride's ex-girlfriend, Ms. Phillips, 
credible in her testimony that "at least as late as October 2012, [Gilbride] stated to her that the 
sums [Gilbride] received from [Kosmann] in the summer and fall of 2012, and the sums he 
expected to receive from Plaintiff thereafter, were related to the transaction involving 
[Kosmann's] house. (R. 71) 
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The court further found that, despite Gilbride's testimony to the contrary, the $30,990 
was paid to Gilbride exchange an unenforceable agreement re-conveyance 
property: 
Application of the [ clean hands] doctrine would allow Defendant a windfall 
in that he would retain title to the real property at issue, as well as sums paid 
to him by Plaintiff based upon the unenforceable agreement for re-
conveyance of the property. 
the 
(R. 74). See also R. 69 ("the court concludes that Plaintiff paid the $30,990.00 to Defendant in 
furtherance of an unenforceable agreement whereby Defendant would purchase the property 
from Plaintiff and re-convey the property to Plaintiff at a later date."); R. 75 ("Defendant was 
unjustly enriched because of amounts paid by Plaintiff in reliance on the unenforceable 
agreement for re-conveyance of the property."); and R. 75 (" The evidence establishes that 
[Kosmann] paid that money to [Gilbride] in furtherance of the unenforceable agreement for re-
conveyance of the property."). The court also explicitly rejected Gilbride's testimony that the 
final payment of $1,000 from Kosmann was for a security deposit: "The evidence establishes 
that Plaintiff paid that money to Defendant in furtherance of the unenforceable agreement for re-
conveyance of the property." (R. 75) The court chose not to address all of the other perjury in 
Gilbride's testimony. 
In the Memorandum Decision, the court rejected: Gilbride's argument to keep the entire 
$30,990 based on the car parts story or the unclean hands defense (R. 72-74), Gilbride's 
argument to keep $6,000 of the $30,990 for repairs to the Property or for a unilateral security 
deposit (R. 74-75), Gilbride's claim that the PSA entitled him to immediate possession of the 
Property after the closing (R. 79-82), and Gilbride's claim for $1773 in monthly rent since the 
closing (R. 82-84). The court ordered the return of the entire $30,990 to Kosmann. (R. 67-69) 
That same day, the court entered a Judgment that stated, "Plaintiff shall recover the sum of 
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against Defendant . [ and] Defendant Gilbride shall have and recover from 
Kosmann the real property located at 1 
(R. 88-89) Gilbride has not appealed any of these district court factual findings and legal 
conclusions. 3 
7 The District Court Reject 's Gilbride 's Attempts to Recover His Fees and Costs From 
Kosmann. 
Emboldened by his successful taking of Kosmann's Property, Gilbride filed a motion for 
fees and costs, seeking an award of $1,447.47 in costs as of right, $2,165.90 in discretionary 
costs, and $90,652.50 in attorney fees from Kosmann. (R. 149) On June 18, 2015, the district 
court Issued its Order on Motions to Disallow Costs and Fees. (R. 14 7-61) The court determined 
that Gilbride was the prevailing party because he was awarded the Property and because 
Kosmann had not accepted an offer of judgment for $32,500. (R. 154-55) The court then did not 
award any fees or discretionary costs because Gilbride failed to show any statute or contract 
allowing him to recover those amounts. The court rejected the applicability of I.C. § 
because: 
The gravamen of the lawsuit was Plaintiffs claim that a valid oral contract 
existed between the parties pursuant to which Defendant had agreed to re-
convey the property at issue to Plaintiff in order to assist Plaintiff in getting 
out of his existing mortgage obligation and securing a lower mortgage 
payment. There is no question that the property at issue was Plaintiffs 
primary residence .... 
Here, Defendant contends that he had a commercial purpose in 
purchasing the property and that Plaintiff ran a business on the property, in 
addition to residing on the property. However, Defendant's purchase of the 
property was not at issue in this case. Instead, the gravamen of the case was 
Plaintiffs claim that there was a contract between the parties for Defendant 
to re-convey the property to Plaintiff after Defendant purchased it. Based on 
the record, there is no question that Plaintiffs purpose was to retain his 
residential property free of his existing mortgage obligation. Plaintiffs 
purpose was not related to his business on the property. So, even if 
120(3) 
3 The district court did not impose any sanction for all of Gilbride' s perjury, and fortunately for Gilbride. Idaho law 
does permit a civil action to recover Kosmann's damages from having to defend against the perjury. 
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Defendant had a business purpose, the lack of such a purpose on Plaintiffs 
part precludes a finding of "the for 
application section 12-1 
(R. 156-57) 
The court also rejected Gilbride's reliance on the attorney fee provision in the PSA: 
"[T]he court concludes that Defendant's second argument is unavailing, because the alleged oral 
agreement for re-conveyance of the property was entirely separate and distinct from the PSA." 
(R. 157) The court explained that from the commencement of the case the parties and the court 
had understood that the litigation was not about the PSA but was about a "separate oral 
agreement whereby Gilbride would transfer the property back to Kosmann at a later date." (R. 
157-58) The court pointed out that Gilbride had admitted as much in pre-trial briefing, and the 
court noted that Gilbride's only counterclaim related to the PSA was rejected. (R. 158-59) 
In the end, it appears the court tried to put the parties in the position they would have 
been in had they done a normal short sale: giving Kosmann back his money (though Gilbride has 
yet to pay it over), giving Gilbride the Property at a very reduced price that also eliminated 
$160,000 in deficiency debt for Kosmann, and making each side pay their own attorney fees. 
Despite Gilbride's shocking dishonesty to Kosmann and perjury to the court, it appears that the 
court felt compelled to give Gilbride the Property because of the legal complications of the 
indefiniteness of the oral agreement and also because Kosmann had already obtained the benefit 
of the short sale, elimination of $160,000 in debt. 
Fortunately, Gilbride's success in his deceit was limited to his retention of the Property. 
He failed in his attempts to: (1) keep Kosmann's $30,990 (though it has not yet been returned), 
(2) obtain another $3,200 in deposits from Kosmann, (3) get a lien on and sell all of Kosmann's 
personal property, which Gilbride tried to do through the Rental Agreement, (4) shut down 
Kosmann's business and eliminate his only source of income at the time, (5) obtain rent 
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payments that were 1 
13, Kosmann 
of the market rent, get Kosmann immediately evicted in 
get Kosmann cited and/or 
of 
(9) deceive the district court regarding dozens of facts, and (10) and have Kosmann reimburse 
Gilbride for the $95,000 in legal costs he incurred to pursue all of Gilbride's dishonesty. (supra 
Section I.B.ii-v) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that Gilbride was not entitled to attorney fees 
under either I.C. § 12-120(3) or the PSA? 
2. If either I.C. § 12-120(3) or the PSA would allow attorney fees to the prevailing 
party, did the district court abuse its discretion by finding that Gilbride was the prevailing party? 
3. If attorney fees could be awardable to Gilbride as the prevailing party under either 
I.C. § 12-120(3) or the PSA, do equitable considerations and the Court's inherent power to 
sanction bad faith behavior preclude any award of fees? 
4. Is Kosmann entitled to recover his attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
I.C. § 12-121 and/or I.AR. 11.2? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Held That LC. § 12-120(3) Is Inapplicable. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a 
civil action to recover on any commercial transaction. Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 469,259 P.3d 
615 "A commercial transaction includes all transactions except those for personal or household 
purposes." Id. For a commercial transaction to be present for the purposes of LC. § 12-120(3) 
"each party to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commerciai purpose." Carrillo v. 
Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741,756,274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012). 
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Court has employed a two-step analysis to determine whether fees § 1 
are 151 Idaho 469, 615. must a 
transaction that is integral to the claim; and [second], the commercial transaction must be the 
basis upon which recovery is sought." Id. Thus, the commercial transaction must constitute the 
gravamen of the lawsuit and form the basis upon which the complaining party seeks recovery. Id. 
Whether the district court properly awarded attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review. Id. 
1. A Transaction Regarding the Refinancing of a Primary Residence Is Not a 
Commercial Transaction. Per This Court's Numerous Precedents. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that litigation regarding refinancing, possession, 
ownership, or a construction contract of a primary residence is not a commercial transaction 
because it is for "personal or household purposes." Fannie Jifae v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 708, 
351 P.3d 622,636 (2015) ("transaction at issue here was to modify the Hafers' home loan" so not 
a commercial transaction); Frontier Dev. Grp., LLC v. Caravella, 157 Idaho 589, 599, 338 P.3d 
1193, 1203 (2014) ("[T]he Caravellas' purpose for entering into the agreement with Horn and 
FDG was to construct a house for their personal use; therefore the transaction was not 
commercial."); Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling, 153 Idaho 735, 743-44, 291 P.3d 418, 426-
27 (2012) (litigation regarding well drilled on primary residence was not a commercial 
transaction); Black Diamond All., LLC v. Kimball, 148 Idaho 798, 802, 229 P.3d 1160, 1164 
(2010) (litigation over ejectment of mortgagor after rescheduled trustee's sale was not 
commercial transaction); PHH Mortgage Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 641, 200 
P .3d 1180, 1190 (2009) ( action to eject defendants from their residence after foreclosure sale was 
not an action to recover in a commercial transaction); Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Horne Loans, 
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Idaho 890, 893, 1 P.3d 691, 694 (action involving the of 
home was not a commercial transaction). 
Here, the transaction between Kosmann and Gilbride involved ownership and possession 
of a primary residence (see Fannie itfae, 158 Idaho 708, 351 P.3d 636 and PHH Mortgage 
Services Corp., 146 Idaho 641, 200 P.3d 1190), attempts to use an oral buy back agreement as a 
way to modify and/or refinance the debt on the primary residence (see Black Diamond All., LLC, 
148 Idaho 802, 229 P.3d 1164 and Bajrektarevic, 143 Idaho 893, 155 P.3d 694), and an oral 
contract related to a primary residence (see Stapleton, 153 Idaho 743-44, 291 P.3d 426-27 and 
Frontier Dev. Grp., LLC, 157 Idaho 599, 338 P.3d 1203). Thus, this case fits squarely within all 
of this Court's precedents cited above. The district court was correct in following this case law. 
2. The Gravamen Of the Litigation Was About the Property As a Primary Residence and 
Not About The Business Run Out of the Home 
Certainly, there were lots of potential purposes for why Kosmann entered into the 
agreement with Gilbride: eliminate an underwater residential mortgage, avoid a future $1,800 
residential mortgage payment, avoid foreclosure on the residence, eliminate a $160,000 
deficiency balance on the residential mortgage, retain his residence of thirteen years, maintain a 
residence for his children, and avoid relocation of his temporary business. The district court 
concluded that the primarv and driving purpose for the agreement with Gilbride was related to 
modifying the debt on the residence and not related to avoiding relocation of the business: 
"Based on the record, there is no question that [Kosmann]' s purpose was to retain his residential 
property free of his existing mortgage obligation." (R. 157, emphasis added) 
The record supports the district court. Kosmann testified that he had not received any 
foreclosure paperwork or otherwise been threatened with losing him home. (Tr. 91: 19-92:8) He 
had stopped paying on his mortgage as part of the short sale process but his payments at the time 
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been $800 a month (he testified that the future they would increase to $1800 a 
1 1:1 1,000 he Gilbride the was to up 
all the past-due mortgage payments. (Tr. 90:24-91: 18, 92:9-12) Thus, the facts show that 
Kosmann's agreement with Gilbride was not driven by imminent foreclosure and relocation or 
interruption of the business. 
Rather, Kosmann stopped payment on his mortgage and entered into the agreement with 
Gilbride because he was trying to execute a short sale that would eliminate the undern:ater 
mortgage, eliminate the $160,000 deficiency, and dramatically reduce Kosmann's future 
mortgage and mortgage payments on the Property. The gravamen of the transaction, from 
Kosmann's perspective, was an attempt to obtain a refinancing or modification of the mortgage 
on his primary residence, with Gilbride assisting him in that as a friend. See Black Diamond All., 
LLC, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P.3d 1164 and Bajrektarevic, 143 Idaho 893, 155 P.3d 694. The district 
court properly interpreted Kosmann's non-commercial reasons for entering into the transaction 
with Gilbride: "The gravamen of the lawsuit was [Kosmann]'s claim that a valid oral contract 
existed between the parties pursuant to which [Gilbride] has agreed to re-convey the property at 
issue to [Kosmann] in order to assist [Kosmann] in getting out of his existing mortgage 
obligation and securing a lower mortgage payment." (R. 156) The district court's factual finding 
on this point was supported by the trial testimony. (Tr. 15:7-13, 16:6-17:16, 30:7-31:5, 152:14-
155:14, 157:13-158:2, 166:17-167:4, 239:24-241:3, 317:23-319:9, 320:23-321:8) 
In addition, a transaction involving a primary residence is not turned into a commercial 
transaction merely because the residence is also used for a temporary business. See also Brower 
v. E.1 DuPont de Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345,349 (1990) ("[T]he award 
of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is remotely connected 
case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises 
hold be to convert award attorney's an 
exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of right in virtually every 
lawsuit filed."); Idaho Newspaper Found. v. Cascade, 117 Idaho 422, 424, 788 P.2d 237, 239 
(Ct App. 1990) ("We think there is a clear distinction between litigation of a dispute arising 
from a commercial transaction and litigation on non-commercial issues that might have future 
commercial ramifications."); Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 971, 972-73, 842 P.2d 307, 308-09 
(Ct. App. 1992); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 663, 962 P.2d 1041, 
104 7 ( 1998) ("The present action is primarily a property dispute to determine ownership and 
easement rights and does not fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction in I.C. § 12-
120(3 ). " Here, Kosmann' s business at the residence was not part of the sale to Gilbride and there 
is no evidence in the record that the business was ever discussed as part of the sale, lease, and 
buyback transaction. As noted in Brower, if every non-commercial litigation about residential 
property becomes commercial merely because a business (that is not being transferred in the 
transaction) is also run at the residence, then the scope of a commercial transaction is greatly 
expanded and attorney fees become even less of an exceptional remedy. As stated in Idaho 
Newspaper, merely because this non-commercial, residential property dispute may have 
implications for Kosmann's temporary business being run on the Property does not turn this into 
a commercial transaction. The district court was correct in determining that the gravamen of the 
transaction at issue was not commercial pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). 
3. Gilbride Did Not Have a Commercial Purpose Either In The Transaction 
In addition, had the district court evaluated Gilbride's purpose in the transaction, it would 
have found that his purposes were also non-commerciaL The district court did not address 
Gilbride's purpose in the transaction because "even if [Gilbride] had a business purpose, the lack 
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a purpose on Plaintiffs precludes a finding "the required symmetry of purpose for 
application 1 show Gilbride did not 
any commercial purpose other than to acquire a new primary residence for cheap by swindling 
his friend. 
Gilbride claims his purpose was investment and to get a rental property. However, the 
facts totally contradict that claim. There is no evidence that Gilbride was interested in investment 
property or looking at any other Property, he had no real tor of his own (Tr. 174:4-21 ), he did not 
use his own money to buy the Property (R. 70-72), he had no liquid money ( other than 
Kosmann's money) in his bank accounts to be investing in real property (Tr. 288:21-289:18), he 
had no agreement with Kosmann about making any profit off the rental payment (Tr. 336:20-
337:6, 410:7-412:13), he had no agreement with Kosmann about a profit from selling the 
Property back to Kosmann (Tr. 130:19-131:8), and he had told his girlfriend that he was just 
buying the house as a favor to honor his military friend and was going to let Kosmann buy the 
house back (Tr. 154:15-155:14, R. 71). Thus, Gilbride's stated intentions to Kosmann and others 
regarding the Property were completely non-commercial. 
Gilbride's secret and deceitful intentions were also non-commercial. The secret 
conversations with code enforcement to shut down Kosmann's income source, the preposterous 
and non-negotiable rental agreement, the unreasonable rental payment demands, the lies and 
threats at Shari's Restaurant, the refusal to follow through on his promise about an lease-to-own 
agreement, and the eviction notice after only tvvo weeks all show that Gilbride always intended 
to push Kosmann out of the Property and take it for his own residence. (supra Section LB) A 
year later, on March 14, 2014, Gilbride confirmed his true intent by serving Kosmann with a 
"Termination of Tenancy Thirty Day Notice" that stated: "your month-to-month tenancy of the 
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premises is terminated for the following reason: I will use propertv as mv primary residence. . . 
is your thirty to vacate the property. (Tr. 81:21-83:21, 18) 
Thus, even Gilbride's secret intentions were not commercial. 
Gilbride's argument th at he had a commercial purpose in the transaction is just an 
extension of his repeated dishonesty with the courts. By any measure, this was a non-commercial 
transaction related to the mvnership and mortgage of a primary residence: Gilbride agreed to a 
transaction to help Kosmann to avoid his underwater mortgage on his residence and Gilbride 
secretly intended to obtain the residence for himself. The district court correctly found that I.C. § 
12-120(3) is completely inapplicable. 
B. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Purchase and Sale Agreement 
Did Not Support a Fee Award For Gilbride. 
The district court interpreted the attorney fee provision in the PSA and concluded that the 
meaning and scope of that provision did not allow Gilbride to recover fees. The district court 
noted that the litigation was not "connected with" the PSA: "the alleged oral agreement for 
reconveyance of the property [ which was the main issue of the litigation] was entirely separate 
and distinct from the PSA." (R. 157) The district court further pointed out that it had previously 
stated that Kosmann was not challenging the PSA in the litigation and Gilbride agreed with that 
summary of the case and the only dispute about the PSA was Gilbride's counterclaim asserting 
that Kosmann had breached the PSA by not immediately turning over possession to the Property 
in December of 2012. (R. 157-159) Thus, since there was no dispute that Kosmann had not 
litigated any issue "connected with" the PSA (and had prevailed on the one disputed issue raised 
by Gilbride connected with the PSA), it was improper to interpret the fee provision of the PSA to 
be so broad as to cover litigation that was not challenging the PSA. (R. 157-159) 
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The cases are not regarding the standard the s 
the a contract term 
"connected with." But see Badell v. Bade!!, 1 Idaho 442, 449, 835 P.2d 677, 684 (Ct. App. 
1992) ("In claims for attorney fees under a contract the trial court must first interpret the 
contract to determine if attorney fees are appropriate before making the discretionary 
determination as to who is the prevailing party. As we have discussed at length above, the 
interpretation of a contract is a question of law over which we exercise free review.") (internal 
citations omitted). Here, whether evaluated under a de novo or abuse of discretion standard, the 
district court was correct in finding that the PSA' s fee provision has no applicability in a lawsuit 
that did not allege a breach of the PSA. 
Gil bride's entire argument is based on an overly broad and erroneous interpretation of the 
term "connected with." The PSA has dozens of substantive terms buyer, seller, purchase price, 
financing, down payment, 1 year rental agreement, condition regarding deficiency, private 
property exclusion, water rights, title conveyance and insurance, etc. The meaning of the term 
"connected with" goes to those dozens of substantive terms actually found in the PSA. 
The PSA, however, does not have any provision regarding a buy back agreement, as 
pointed out by Gilbride's counsel during trial. (Tr. 98:17-25) The PSA also does not have any 
provision regarding Kosmann's ownership of the $30,990 that he invested, again as pointed out 
by Gilbride's counsel during trial. (Tr. 113:1-13) The litigation brought by Kosmann was 
exclusively related to an oral promise for a buy back of the Property and for a return of the 
$30,990 invested. Therefore, the litigation was not "connected with"' any of the terms of the 
PSA. 
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court properly that the correct fee 
was parties were agreeing to terms that and were 
agreeing to pay attorney fees to the prevailing party in litigation connected with the enforcement 
of those PSA terms. To interpret "connected with" in any other way would be to completely 
untether the attorney fee provision from the PSA where it was contained. This litigation was only 
connected with terms outside the PSA ( other than Gilbride' s counterclaim for immediate 
possession that he lost) and therefore the PSA's attorney fee provision is inapplicable. 
In addition, the district court was correct in pointing out that Kosmann never claimed he 
was bringing the lawsuit to enforce or rescind the PSA or any express or implied terms therein.
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Kosmann, the district court, and Gilbride all understood that Kosmann was bringing a lawsuit to 
enforce separate terms from an oral contract about a buyback agreement. That oral contract did 
not have any specific terms regarding a purchase price, a buyback date, or an attorney fee 
provision. Gilbride "prevailed" regarding the buyback contract based on the indefiniteness of the 
purchase price and buyback date. Gilbride loses on recovery of attorney fees because that 
buyback contract is also indefinite about attorney fees (or more accurately, does not have an 
attorney fee provision). Gilbride cannot have it both ways. The district court correctly found that 
the PSA attorney fee provision was completely inapplicable. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Determining That Gilbride vVas the 
Prevailing Party In The Litigation. 
The district court rnled that Gilbride was the prevailing party but then that ruling became 
irrelevant because the district court ruled that no statute or contract would allow Gilbride to 
4 Gilbride should consider himself fo1iunate that Kosmann's prior counsel did not challenge the PSA and seek to 
have it voided based on the dozens of misstatements and actions of deceit by Gilbride or based on the mistake of 
believing the oral buyback contract was enforceabie. Certainiy, at a minimum, Gilbride intentionally violated a key, 
explicit contingency of the PSA: a reasonable lease of at least a year. For whatever reason, Kosmann's former 
counsel did not litigate those issues and therefore did not prevail in returning the Property to Kosmann's ownership. 
Having been so fotiunate as to not have the PS1\ challenged, Gilbride cannot claim that he prevailed on the PSA or 
is entitled to fees thereunder. 
recover his attorney fees from Kosmann. Even if this Court were inclined to reverse the district 
court regarding the applicability any attorney fee statute or contract provision, Court 
should still affirm (on alternate grounds) the result reached by the district court because Gilbride 
should not be considered the prevailing party. See, e.g., Edged in Stone, Inc. v. Nw. Power Sys., 
LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 181, 321 P.3d 726, 731 (2014) ('"Where the lower court reaches the correct 
result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory.' ... We 
affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment to NWPS because it reached the 
correct result, although by a different theory."). 
Here the district court correctly noted that the prevailing party decision is a discretionary 
decision but the district court then failed to property act within the outer boundaries of that 
discretion or to property exercise reason in its decision. See, e.g., Idaho Military Historical Soc y, 
Inc. v. lvfaslen, 156 Idaho 624, 629-31, 329 P.3d 1072, 1077-79 (2014). 
1. The District Court's Erroneously Evaluated the Record and Gave Four Incorrect 
Reasons To Support Gilbride As the Prevailing Party. 
The district court used four rationale for finding Gilbride was the prevailing party: ( 1) 
Gilbride' s success in obtaining the Property was the "primary issue in this litigation"; (2) 
Kosmann's success in recovering the $30,990 "provided limited alternative relief'; (3) Gilbride 
prevailed on numerous issues: ejectment, fraud, specific performance, the alleged oral contract; 
and (4) Kosmann turned do\vn an offer of judgment for $32,500 that was delivered on January 
28, 2013. (R. 154-55) None of these reasons is consistent with the applicable legal standards nor 
do they stand up to reason upon close scrutiny of this litigation. 
i. Recovering the $30,990 Was Not a Lesser Issue to Recovery of the Property and 
Kosmann Obtained 1Huch Greater Judicial Relief at Trial. 
When looked at from an overall view, this case was about two main issues: ultimate 
ownership of the Property (i.e. whether Kosmann could enforce the oral agreement to have it 
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back to him) and return of the $30,990 that Kosmann gave to Gilbride. The "primary issue" 
was Gilbride would be allovved to Kosmann out 
and his $30,990. To treat the Property as primary and the $30,990 as "limited alternative relief' 
is incorrect and an abuse of discretion. The testimony was that the Property was worth $130,000 
under the sales comparison approach and Gilbride "purchased" it for $117,500. (Tr. 281: 12-
282: l 4) Thus, in pure economic terms, Gilbride prevailed in keeping $12,500 in equity (since he 
put none of his own money into the purchase) and Kosmann prevailed in recovering his $30,990. 
In addition, Gilbride asked the district court for an avvard of another $18,325 in rent, which was 
rejected. (Tr. 336:20-337:6; R. 82-84) So, in terms of pure economics, Kosmann prevailed on 
$49,315 and Gilbride prevailed on $12,500. Certainly Kosmann wanted to recover his home, but 
there is no objective evidence to say that this was the primary issue that dwarfed his desire to 
recover his $30,990 and avoid another $18,325 in rent. 
In addition, the $30,990 was not mere "alternative relief' that Kosmann obtained only 
because he failed with enforcing the oral contract. Kosmann proved at trial that he was entitled to 
recover the $30,990 regardless of whether he also recovered the Property. The agreement was 
that Kosmann put his money into the Property as a 25% down payment and he would thus 
eventually get it back when he bought back the Property. (supra Section LB.ii-iii; R. 67-75) This 
$30,990 was at least an equallv important part of his lawsuit. 
ii. Kosmann Prevailed On Afore Issues and Obtained ~More Relief At Trial 
The district court also got it wrong by asserting that Gilbride prevailed on four issues 
and/or more issues than Kosmann. The district was improperly counting claims rather than 
focusing on the relief obtained. IRCP 54(d)(l)(B) ("In determining which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties."); see 
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also _Eighteen Ranch. v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 71 71 117 
prevailing party lS and determined an 
overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.") 
Compounding that error, the district counted duplicative claims in order to claim that 
Gilbride prevailed on more claims. Kosmann's fraud and breach of contract claims were 
completely duplicative of his unjust enrichment claims, i.e. merely other possible bases to 
recover the same damages of $30,990 and the Property (Kosmann never asked for any other type 
of damages). (Aug. R. 67) Gilbride's ejectment counterclaim was duplicative of Kosmann not 
being able to enforce the oral contract. By treating those claims as separate when they were not, 
the district court improperly concluded that Gilbride prevailed on more issues in the case. 
Again, boiled down to the basics of what each party was trying to do, Kosmann was 
trying to get back his Property and his $30,990 and Gilbride was trying to keep both and trying 
to get an additional $18,325 in rent. (Aug. R. 56-82) Kosmann prevailed on two of those three 
substantive issues at trial. Kosmann prevailed on more substantive issues and he obtained greater 
economic relief at trial. Counting duplicative claims while ignoring the substantive issues and 
relief is an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
iii. The Offer of Judgment Does Not }Jake Gilbride the Prevailing Party 
The district court also said, "while it is not necessary to the court's determination on this 
issue, the court also notes that the Defendants Rule 68 Offer of Judgment in the amount of 
$32,500, more than Plaintiffs recovered on his unjust enrichment claim, weighs in favor of the 
court's conclusion, especially since Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim was his only viable claim 
for damages." (R. 154) This offer of judgment was made on January 28, 2013 (R. 120-21), three 
days after Kosmann filed his lawsuit, seventeen days after Gilbride posted the eviction notice 
that reneged on his admitted agreement to rent the Property back to Gilbride, prior to any 
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including any deposition Gilbride, prior to Gilbride inventing car parts 
to an , and 
prior to Kosmann ( or his attorney) having any real understanding of the true facts of the case and 
Gilbride's dishonesty. The litigation then continued for the next two years and there is no 
evidence that Gilbride ever renewed his offer to return the stolen $30,990. Instead, Gilbride 
invented numerous arguments to try and protect the stolen money: none of it should be returned 
based on the unclean hands defense (R. 72-75), Kosmann is only entitled to car parts rather than 
the money (R. 69-72), $1,000 ofit should not be returned because it is a security deposit (R. 75), 
and/or $5,000 of it should not be returned to pay for repairs on the Property (R. 75). All of these 
arguments were rejected by the district court. 
Gilbride's reliance on the offer of judgment, therefore, flips the purpose of the offer of 
judgment on its head. Gilbride offered to return the stolen $30,990 only in exchange for getting 
to keep title to the stolen Property. He only offered to return the money during the first week of 
litigation, before Kosmann's attorney could know all the facts or arguments to properly evaluate 
the case. Gilbride then apparently believed that the early offer gave him cover such that he had 
nothing to lose in making whatever arguments he wanted regarding the $30,990 and even if he 
lost, he could still claim to have won because of the early offer of judgment. Such an application 
of IRCP 68 would send all the wrong incentives to parties. Had Gilbride actually returned the 
stolen $30,990 prior to trial, then he could have a colorable argument that he prevailed on the 
main issues at trial. Instead, he chose to invent a car parts story and perjure himself, all in an 
unsuccessful effort to keep the $30,990. Despite completely losing on the issue of $30,990, he is 
before this Court claiming that he prevailed because he made an offer to return the stolen money 
during a fourteen day period in January of 2013. That is completely wrong-headed. There are 
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instances where the district court can consider an of judgment purposes 
but is not one them. 
iv. The Offer of Judgment Was Not For More Value Than What Kosmann Obtained 
Through the Litigation. 
Furthermore, the district court again took a very limited view of the issues in this case by 
asserting that the offer of judgment was for more than what Kosmann ultimately recovered. At 
the time of the offer of judgment, Kosmann was, at a minimum, only thirty-three days into a one 
year lease on the Property. Even if Kosmann had accepted the offer of judgment, he would have 
given up ownership of the Property but nothing would have been resolved regarding his 
possession of the Property under the agreed upon lease. Kosmann's complaint sought no relief 
regarding the rental agreement and the offer of judgment said nothing about the rental 
agreement, so the offer of judgment certainly would not have resolved that issue. (R. 40-46, 47-
53) Gilbride had already tried to evict Kosmann. In addition, for the next two years, Gilbride 
insisted that Kosmann had to sign an unconscionable Rental Agreement, shut down his business 
on the Property, and pay a rental amount that was more than 170% of the market rate. (supra 
Section LB.iv) Those issues would not have been resolved by accepting the Offer of Judgment. 
Undoubtedly, had Kosmann agreed to just take his stolen $30,990 back and drop his 
enforcement of his oral buyback agreement, he would have immediately been in litigation with 
Gilbride again to try and avoid eviction and all the other unconscionable terms being demanded 
by Gilbride. Instead, by not accepting the Offer of Judgment, Kosmann ultimately got back his 
money, plus he was able to receive the promised benefit of "at least" a one year lease (ultimately 
a two and a half year lease) without the egregious terms or rental payment demanded by 
Gilbride, was able to keep his home of thirteen years for himself and his children for another 30 
months, and was able to continue his business on the Property. It was an abuse of reason and 
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discretion for the district court to claim that Kosmann received from the litigation than what 
from Offer of Judgment. 
2. The Whole Picture Shows That Gilbride Caused the Entire Litigation Because of His 
Dishonest Actions and Then He Did Not "Prevail" On Most of His Dishonesty. 
It addition, the district court failed to examine all of the underlying facts behind this 
litigation that show who "primarily precipitated" the lawsuit and how Gilbride did not "prevail" 
on the vast majority of his machinations against Kosmann. Idaho Military Historical Socy, Inc. 
v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 629-31, 329 P.3d 1072, 1077-79 (2014)("While the Defendants were 
successful at avoiding a finding of damages, the district court found that this action was 
primarily precipitated by Defendants' refusal to surrender possession of the Fairchild airplane."): 
Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., No. 43027, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 54, at *45-46 
(Mar. 1, 2016) ("The instant case is similar to kfaslen in that each of Syringa's claims, including 
those on which it did not prevail, was primarily precipitated by the conduct challenged in Count 
Three-DO A's violation of the procurement statutes in awarding the SBPOs."). 
The underlying facts show that Gilbride "primarily precipitated" the litigation by 
reneging on his stated promise to help Gilbride to keep his home, by secretly trying to get 
Gilbride's business shut down, by using dishonest threats to try to get Kosmann to sign an 
unconscionable lease, and by seeking to evict Kosmann based on trumped up reasons. The 
underlying facts further show that Gilbride did not prevail on most of what he was trying to 
accomplish: (1) his multiple attempts and arguments for keeping Kosmann' s $30,990 (though it 
has not yet been returned), (2) obtaining another $3,200 in deposits from Kosmann, (3) getting a 
lien on and selling all of Kosmann' s personal property through the Rental Agreement, ( 4) 
shutting down Kosmann's business and eliminating his source of income at the time, (5) 
obtaining rent payments that were 170% of the market rent, (6) getting Kosmann evicted in 
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of 13, getting Kosmann evicted May 14, getting Kosmann 
district court 
district court abused its discretion by not looking at the big picture of who prevailed. 
3. Gilbride Is Seeking To Recover As Prevailing Party For Fees Completely Unrelated 
to the One Legal Issue Where He Prevailed. 
Finally, the district court did not even address the fact that Gilbride only prevailed on one 
legal issue that was based in only five minutes of trial testimony. Had Gilbride just admitted 
from the beginning of the litigation that he agreed to help Kosmann by buying the Property with 
Kosmann's money and then selling it back to Kosmann but then reneged on that agreement, then 
the litigation would have been simple and focused on one legal issue: was the oral agreement 
sufficiently definite to enforce against Gilbride. Instead, Gilbride concocted lies and perjured 
himself and turned a very limited litigation into two and a half years of litigation. When the trial 
transcript is examined, almost all of the trial testimony given was unnecessary but for Gilbride' s 
dishonesty and perjury. Now, Gilbride wants to profit from all of his lies by trying to recover all 
his attorney fees that should have been completely unnecessary to resolve the real issue of this 
case. 
Thus, by any measure, Gilbride was not the prevailing party in this litigation. It was an 
abuse of discretion for the district court to find otherwise. At a minimum, the district court 
should have said that both parties prevailed in part such that no fees would be awarded. See, e.g., 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho at 538, 224 P.3d at 1127 (citing Israel v. Leachman, 139 
Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003)). More on point, the district court should have determined 
that Kosmann was the overall prevailing party who lost on one legal technicality regarding his 
home (because he trusted his friend too much and had not worked out the specifics of when and 
for how much he was going to buy back the Property) and prevailed on all other nine issues 
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Gilbride tried to take advantage of him. Either , Gilbride should not recover any fees 
as prevailing party. 
D. It Would Be Unjust to Allow Gilbride to Recover His Attorney Fees 
Even if this Court were inclined to reverse either of the district court's conclusions 
regarding§ 12-120(3) or the fee provision in the PSA and uphold the district court's conclusion 
that Gilbride was the prevailing party, this Court should still reject Gilbride's fee request based 
on the equities of this case. 
In opposing Gilbride's request for fees, Kosmann argued, "The amount of Attorney's 
Fees claimed is excessive and unreasonable in light of Defendant's false testimony regarding car 
parts .... Given the adverse credibility determination, Defendant should not be rewarded by a 
grant of attorney's fees and costs." (R. 136-137, AR 88-91) The district court reached its ruling 
denying attorney fees without addressing the issue of the impropriety of a party being awarded 
attorney fees despite being found to have attempted to deceive the court regarding the central 
issues of the case. However, this Court can reach that issue now to deny fees. See, e.g., Edged in 
Stone, Inc., 156 Idaho at 181, 321 P .3d at 731. 
This Court has the inherent power to sanction improper conduct by litigants. See 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-49, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132-35 (1991) (describing the 
inherent power of courts to punish contempt, fraud, dishonesty, and bad faith by litigants and 
protect the integrity of the courts); State v. Rogers, 143 Idaho 320, 322, 144 P.3d 25, 27 (2006) 
("[T]his Court has recognized that trial courts also have an 'inherent authority to assess sanctions 
for bad faith conduct against all parties appearing before it."'); Talbot v. Ames Constr., 127 
Idaho 648, 653, 904 P.2d 560, 565 (1995) (quoting Chambers: "When there is bad-faith conduct 
in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the rules, the court ordinarily 
should rely on the rules rather than the inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the 
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court, neither the statue nor the rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on inherent 
Within this Court's inherent authority to punish fraud and dishonesty a litigant 
through an award of attorney fees is the lesser power of disallovving attorney fees as a 
punishment and in order to do justice. 
Here, the district court found that Gilbride perjured himself regarding the central issues of 
his case. (supra Section LB.vi) Gilbride provided testimony about a car parts deal that the district 
court found non-credible. (Id.) Gilbride claimed that he received $30,990 for car parts rather than 
an as part of an oral agreement to allow Kosmann to buy back the Property and again the court 
found this non-credible. (Id.) In other words, the vast majority of Gilbride's trial testimony was 
explicitly found to be non-credible. As detailed above, most of the rest of Gilbride's testimony 
( e.g., why he used such an onerous Rental Agreement and why he was talking secretly with Code 
Enforcement) was similarly non-credible but the district court choose not to point out these 
additional examples of perjury. (supra Section I.B.iv-v) In sum, most of Gilbride's defenses and 
counterclaims were based on his perjured testimony. Kosmann, on the other hand, ultimately was 
not able to enforce the oral buyback agreement because he was truthful in admitting that no 
specific price or time had been agreed upon by the parties. (supra Section LB.vi) Gilbride is now 
before this Court seeking to recover his attorney fees in bringing litigation that he perpetuated 
through perjury. 
In addition, the record supports the clear conclusion that Gilbride was trying to deceive 
Kosmann. (supra Section I.B.i-v) Gilbride deceived Kosmann about the buyback agreement and 
ultimately was successful in retaining the Property because of the indefiniteness of the buyback 
agreement. (Id.) Fortunately Gilbride was unsuccessful in (1) his multiple attempts and 
arguments for keeping Kosmann's $30,990 (though it has not yet been returned), (2) obtaining 
36 
in deposits from Kosmann, getting a on and selling s 
through and 
eliminating his source of income at the time, (5) obtaining rent payments that were 170% of the 
market rent, (6) getting Kosmann evicted in January of 2013, (7) getting Kosmann evicted in 
May of 2014, (8) and getting Kosmann fined by the CCCE. (Id.) 
Gilbride perpetuated all of this deceit against Kosmann and tried to use this litigation to 
assist him in the deceit and now he is asking this Court to validate all of his actions by awarding 
him attorney fees and costs. Equity should not allow it. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43-49, 111 S. 
Ct. at 2132-35. Perjury, deceit, and abuse of the litigation system should not be rewarded with an 
award of attorney fees and costs. If this case were to be remanded to consider an award of 
reasonable attorney fees, the district court certainly should have the discretion to disallow all fees 
based on the perjury, deceit, and abuse of the legal system that occurred in this case. This Court 
should avoid such unnecessary additional litigation and resolve this matter based on the 
unconscionability of Gilbride asking for an award of attorney fees to fund his deceit, perjury, and 
abuse in this case. 
E. Attorney Fees and Costs Should Be Awarded On Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 41, J.C. 
§ 12-121 and I.A.R. 11.2. 
Under I.C. § 12-121, only the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. This 
Court has stated that attorney fees on appeal are awarded under this statute when the Court is 
"left with an abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation." See, e.g., Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 
1036, 1049 (2008). "Such circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the appellate 
court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the 
district court incorrectly applied well-established law." Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 645-46, 
43, 47-48 1 "[ A ]ttorney fees can be awarded as sanctions [ under I.AR. l 
the frivolous filings or the improper 
purpose clause.'' Sims v. Jacobson, 342 P.3d 907, 914 (Idaho 2015). 
In the full context of what Gilbride has done in this litigation and how he has abused the 
legal system and tried to deceive both Kosmann and the district court, his additional efforts to 
validate his deceit through an award of attorney fees should be considered frivolous, 
unreasonable or without foundation under LC.§ 12-121 and brought for an improper purpose 
under I.AR. 11.2. (supra Section I.B.i-v) Gilbride cannot reasonably believe that the law vvill 
condone his actions by awarding him attorney fees, and he is bringing the appeal for the 
improper purpose of trying to benefit from his deceit and to futiher harm Kosmann financially. 
Gilbride still has not turned over Kosmann's $30,990, he already took Kosmann's house, he 
already made Kosmann spend thousands in attorney fees litigating the case below to try and get 
back both that were taken by Gilbride as part of a clear scheme of dishonesty, and now Gilbride 
has pursued this appeal hoping to further bankrupt Kosmann. 
In addition, Gilbride' s arguments about the meaning of "connected with" and the 
gravamen of the litigation were merely an attempt to second-guess the trial court by reweighing 
the evidence. The trial court evaluated all the evidence at trial and concluded that "Based on the 
record, there is no question that Plaintiffs purpose was not related to his business on the 
property" and "the alleged oral agreement for re-conveyance of the property was entirely 
separate and distinct from the PSA" Gilbride is merely "ask[ing] the appellate court to second-
guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence" that supported those two factual conclusions. 
Gilbride has already harmed Kosmann in innumerable ways and he should not be allowed 
to perpetuate his deceitful litigation without having to reimburse Kosmann for this frivolous and 
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unreasonable appeal that lacks foundation and vvas brought for an improper purpose. Having 
sanction perjury and deceit, Gilbride should not be able to this 
litigation without paying for Kosmann's fees and costs on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons stated above, Kosmann respectfully requests that the Court deny 
Gilbride's appeal and award attorney fees and costs to Kosmann on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of March, 2016. 
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